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 Despite the popularity and unique nature of women’s 
self-help groups in India, evidence of their economic 
impacts is scant. Based on two rounds of a 2,400 
household panel, the authors use double differences, 
propensity score matching, and pipeline comparison to 
assess economic impacts of longer (2.5-3 years) exposure 
of a program that promoted and strengthened self-help 
programs in Andhra Pradesh in India. The analysis finds 
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that longer program exposure has positive impacts on 
consumption, nutritional intake, and asset accumulation. 
Investigating heterogeneity of the impacts suggests 
that even the poorest households were able to benefit 
from the program. Furthermore, overall benefits would 
exceed program cost by a significant margin even under 
conservative assumptions.  
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1. Introduction  
India has long taken efforts to expand credit availability to rural areas. Early programs, which often 
yielded disappointing results, were gradually replaced by efforts to establish self-help groups (SHGs) and 
link them to banks. In 1992, India’s National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) 
piloted the concept with 500 groups. Since then, the SHG movement has witnessed tremendous growth 
that brought about one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing networks for micro-finance. In 2007, 
some 40 million households were organized in more than 2.8 million SHGs that borrowed more than US$ 
1 billion of credit from banks in 2006/7 alone (Reserve Bank of India 2008). Cumulative credit disbursed 
to SHGs amounted to some US$ 4.5 billion (or about 10% of total rural credit) in India (Garikipati 2008).  
The SHG-led approach differs from traditional micro-finance in a number of ways. First, it does not 
exclusively focus on credit or savings but also includes emphasis on social empowerment, outreach, and 
capacity building. Recognizing that households’ lack of human and social capital may prevent them from 
making good use of financial resources even if they had access to them, program organizers put a strong 
focus on encouraging the groups to establish regular meetings among group members and group savings. 
There is also an emphasis on outreach whereby existing groups are encouraged to help the “leftover poor” 
in their village to form SHGs. Second, the goal is not to establish a separate micro-finance institution but 
to use the group to intermediate in dealings with the formal sector and help households to create a “credit 
history” that will eventually allow them to access regular sources of finance. Finally, federation of SHGs 
is a central element not only with respect to peer monitoring and diversification of risks on the financial 
side but federations at village and higher levels are also used to assist in implementation of government 
programs, help SHGs provide other services -from technical assistance to marketing- and allow members’ 
participation in local government.  
This implies that India’s SHG movement has many of the elements, such as “saver graduation” and a 
built-in tendency towards membership expansion, that have been identified as key to make micro-finance 
sustainable (Ahlin and Jiang 2008). Indeed, a large and growing literature discusses SHGs’ evolution, 
their role in the broader financial system (Basu and Srivastava 2005, Sinha 2006, Shah et al. 2007) and 
recent innovative practices (Nair 2005). However, even within India, the geographical focus of SHGs was 
concentrated in few states; in fact 70 to 80% of SHGs are in the four southern states of Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala and therefore, there is considerable scope for expansion. To justify 
such expansion, an in-depth quantitative assessment of the impact of the SHG model for micro-credit on 
key household level outcomes, in particular of its economic effects would be warranted.  
  2Such an evaluation has to deal with a number of practical challenges: First, in many cases the success of 
SHGs made it attractive for policy makers to quickly expand the program, implying that establishing a 
control is not always easy. For example, in Andhra Pradesh (AP) a first phase targeted only 6 districts but 
a follow-up program to expand coverage to the entire state was launched less than 3 years after the launch 
of the original intervention. As the target group includes the poorest who require considerable training 
and capacity building before they will be in a position to be able to successfully use and repay loans, this 
may be too short to expect large economic impacts. Second, with clear benefits and economies of scale 
from federation, random selection of treated and control groups within sufficiently small administrative 
units (mandals, equivalent to counties) is difficult and, even if agreed upon at the start, may not be 
maintained during implementation. Finally, impacts are likely to differ according to participation status 
but participation is likely to be endogenous and thus needs to be controlled for.  
This paper provides an evaluation of the SHG-based micro-credit model using a large-scale World Bank 
supported intervention in the state of Andhra Pradesh (AP) that included three elements of interest, 
namely (i) efforts to foster formation of SHGs by the “leftover poor”; (ii) capacity building for existing 
SHGs and establishment of second tier institutions at the village and mandal (county) levels to use 
economies of scale in capacity building, credit and insurance, and interaction with the public and the 
private sectors in larger-scale programs; and (iii) a one-time injection of equity to the second tier 
institutions aiming to provide them with seed capital to remedy the multiple market and government 
failures typical of rural India.  
The data to do so are from a 2,400 household panel based on two surveys, conducted in 2004 and 2006, in 
treatment mandals where the program had started in early 2001 and a set of randomly chosen control 
mandals where the program became available in late 2003. We compare the outcomes between program 
SHG participates in the treated counties and those in the control area had not yet reached maturity, our 
results can be interpreted as providing an estimate of 2.5 year program exposure by mature groups, rather 
than participation per se. Double differences are used to eliminate bias due to time-invariant factors. Also, 
to address differences in observables that may limit comparability between treatment and control 
households, propensity score matching methods are used. Moreover, we allow for heterogeneity of impact 
by letting impact differ by SHG participation status or initial poverty status for SHG members’ counties 
by relying on the assumption that unobservable attributes of these groups are not significantly different 
between treatment and control areas.  
Our results point to significant economic gains from program participation in the form of better nutrition 
and higher levels of consumption as well as asset accumulation, for SHG participants but not for those 
who are merely living in program areas. Differentiating by participants’ poverty status suggests that the 
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poorest of the poor experienced nutritional gains and increased their level of asset accumulation but not 
consumption. This suggests that, for households targeted by this type of program, economic impacts will 
materialize over time. More importantly, with different impacts depending on participants’ initial wealth 
level, adapting interventions to the intended target group can have benefits. The fact that the program 
became available in the control counties since late 2003 suggests that our estimates provide a lower bound 
of the program’s term impact. Therefore, a side benefit of our analysis is that it allows us to obtain an 
empirical estimate of the cost-benefit ratio of the program.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two describes key features of the program and links our 
analysis to the literature. On the basis of a brief discussion of data and descriptive statistics, section three 
identifies hypotheses to be explored. Section three also describes the empirical strategy which combines 
pipeline comparison, double differences, and propensity score matching. Section four presents estimation 
results for the overall sample and for subgroups defined by their participation and initial poverty status. 
Section five concludes and draws some implications for program design and future research. 
2. Program description and data 
The program of interest combines micro-credit and savings generation with social empowerment in an 
innovative way that can be illustrated through descriptive statistics at household- and group-level. While 
earlier literature shows that such programs had positive impacts on social and economic empowerment, 
there has been little evidence on economic effects. Our setting, which provides an estimate of the impact 
of some 2.5 years of additional program participation by mature groups, could be of broader interest.  
2.1 Key program characteristics  
The SHG model in India combines savings generation and micro-lending with social mobilization. A 
typical SHG consists of 10-20 members who meet regularly to discuss social issues and activities and, 
during these meetings, deposit a small thrift payment into a joint bank account. Once enough savings have 
been accumulated, group members can apply for internal loans that draw on accumulated savings at an 
interest rate to be determined by the group. Having established a record of internal saving and repayment, 
the group can become eligible for loans through a commercial bank, normally at a fixed ratio (normally 
starting at 4:1) to its equity capital. Rules adopted by the group specify the periodicity of meetings, the 
amount to be saved per meeting, the length of repayment period, the interest rate to be charged on internal 
and external loans which can be higher than that at which the loans are received, as well as the amounts 
and mechanism by which loans are allocated.  
  4To promote formation of new SHGs and strengthen existing ones in the state’s six poorest districts, the 
Government of AP implemented the District Poverty Initiatives Project (DPIP) over the 2001-2006 
period. Supported by a US$ 110 million World Bank loan, this program had organized 2.29 million 
households from 316 mandals in 171,618 SHGs and federated them into 9,872 village organizations 
(VOs) at the village level and 316 mandal samakhyas (MSs) at the mandal (county) level by December 
2006 (World Bank 2007). The main idea of this program was to link capacity building with a one-time 
infusion of equity capital to not only form new SHGs but also establish them as economically viable and 
self-reliant institutions. To do so, a three-pronged strategy was adopted. 
First, efforts to induce formation of new SHGs to include poorer strata of the population who had been 
left out of earlier attempts were undertaken. To determine the target group, the state’s 2001 “below 
poverty line” census which is routinely used to determine eligibility for government programs was 
complemented by a large effort of “participatory identification of the poor” (PIP) that added vulnerability 
and social exclusion to quantitative census indicators. The resulting lists, which assigned all households 
to the poorest of the poor (POP), poor, middle class, or rich, were confirmed by village assemblies.
1 
Resources, in the form of community organizers, were then made available corresponding to the number 
of target households, to help form new groups that would achieve near-universal coverage.  
Second, existing and newly formed SHGs were to be strengthened through set up and support of a 
federated SHG structure at village, county (mandal), and district (zilla) levels through Village 
Organizations (VOs), Mandal Samakhyas (MSs), and Zilla Samakhyas (ZSs). A VO includes about 20 
SHGs in the village and is governed by an executive committee to which each member SHG sends two 
representatives. A number of other committees, depending on need, are formed as well, and a similar 
pattern is followed at mandal and zilla levels. In addition to being able to obtain loans wholesale from 
Banks and on-lend them to members, VOs and MSs also take over implementation of government 
programs and provide a link between their membership and local government institutions. One important 
program intervention is the so-called rice credit line (RCL). This enables the VO to acquire subsidized 
rice under the public distribution system in bulk and make it available to SHG members as an in-kind 
credit with any savings from bulk purchase being passed on to members in the form of lower prices. 
Anecdotal accounts suggest that this allowed the poor to circumvent the well-documented problems of the 
public distribution system (Kochar 2005) and thus was widely popular. The prospect of reliable rice 
                                                 
1 The manual used in the process defines poorest of the poor as those who can eat only when they get work and who lack shelter, proper 
clothing, respect in society, and cannot send their children to school; The poor have no land, live on daily wages, and need to 
send school going children to work in times of crisis. The ‘not so poor’“middle class” have some land, proper shelter, send their 
children to public schools, are recognized in society, and have access to bank credit as well as public services. The non-poorrich, 
having land of at least 5 acres, no problem for food, shelter, clothing, can hire laborers, send children to private schools, 
use private hospitals, lend rather than borrow money, and have considerable social status.. 
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attendance, saving, and (re)payment. 
A final element of the project strategy is to support the building of capacity and equity. As weak capacity 
had been a key reason for the failure of earlier credit and saving programs, the program placed strong 
emphasis on forming training institutions in each mandal to train leaders and accountants from new SHGs 
in basic management and accounting, making available trained “master book keepers” to check the 
accounts of SHGs, and supporting community assistants to provide technical assistance to the start-up and 
conduct of entrepreneurial activities. The main instrument to assist in rapidly building up group equity 
was the community investment fund (CIF) which was made available to SHGs for on-lending to their 
members and to provide collateral for borrowing from banks. This allowed to jump-start lending and 
provided the group with a reliable source of income and profit in the form of interest payments.
2  
Spreads earned in this way provide a source of revenue that may be used for economic activities such as 
adding value to local agricultural production through marketing or processing, or social mobilization. 
Despite considerable interest in promoting SHGs that spawned many tools to help with implementation, 
evidence on economic impacts has been very limited. A survey in one of the first SHG-districts finds that, 
at a qualitative level, SHGs helped reduce vulnerability to drought, encouraged entrepreneurial behavior 
and livelihood diversification, and improved social capital (Garikipati 2008). Positive empowerment 
impacts on SHG participants are also found from a larger five-state sample (Swain and Wallentin 2008).  
Studies of the AP project considered here support the general conclusion of a significant and positive 
impact on social empowerment but are less clear on economic impacts. One study concludes that, while 
the project had a positive impact on risk coping, some aspects of female empowerment, and non-food 
expenditure, a lasting impact on livelihood activities is unlikely (Lastarria-Cornhiel and Shimamura 
2008). Similarly, after three years of implementation, SHG participants had improved their nutrition and 
social empowerment but there were no significant impact on economic outcomes such as income or asset 
accumulation (Deininger and Liu 2009). Below, we test whether economic effects materialized at 
subsequent stages of group development.  
2.2 Data description and household level evidence 
We rely on two survey rounds at household and group levels conducted from February to June of 2004 
and August to October of 2006. The survey covers 51 mandals from three districts (Anantapur, Adilabad 
and Srikakulam) which were chosen to represent the state’s three macro-regions (Rayalaseema, 
Telangana, and Coastal AP). Out of the 51 mandals, 41 were assigned to be treatment where the program 
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accessed only from 2003.
3 To ensure sufficient coverage of the target group, poor households were 
oversampled using the lists that classified all villagers by poverty status based on census data.
4 The 
household sample consists of 1,877 and 529 households in treated and control mandals, respectively. 
Male and female parts of the instrument were administered separately – and as far as possible 
simultaneously – to the main male or female person in the household, normally the head and spouse.
5  
Household-level outcome variables include consumption, nutritional intake, and assets. Consumption 
includes food and non-food consumption over the past 30 days and more lumpy items over the past year.
6 
We compute the amount of calories and protein consumed by multiplying physical quantities of more 
than 30 food items in the questionnaire’s consumption section each with their caloric and protein content 
based on the main reference for Indian foods (Gopalan et al. 2004).
7 Non-financial assets include 
consumer durables, productive, and livestock assets.
8 Throughout, consumption and asset are expressed in 
per capita terms based on adult equivalent measures.
9 
Household level outcome variables are illustrated in table 1 for control and treated mandals separately for 
the periods of 2003/2004 and 2005/2006. While nutritional intake was close for households in the control 
and treated mandals, total consumption was lower for the treated than the control in both years. 
Households in treated mandals owned more non-financial assets than those in the control mandals in both 
years. Table 2 summarizes household demographics and initial conditions for the whole sample, control 
and treated mandals separately. Although control mandals were supposed to be randomly selected, 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 While the CIF was initially made available to SHGs, it was shifted to VOs and later on to MSs as soon as these were 
established.  
3 Three districts (Anantapur, Adilabad and Srikakulam) were chosen to represent the state’s three macro-regions and mandals were selected 
randomly. Out of the 51 sampled mandals, 41 were assigned to be treatment, implying that the program was made available from 2001 whereas 
10 were randomly assigned to be controls implying that the program could be accessed only from 2003. Among the 10 control mandals, 
four are from Srikakulam, two from Anantapur, and four from Adilabad. Villages, groups, and households were then 
selected randomly in each mandal. 
4 Sampling fractions are 0.4 for the ‘“poorest of the poor’”, 0.3 for the ‘poor’“poor”, 0.2 for ‘“not so poor’” households, 
and 0.1 for ‘“non- poor’” households. All descriptive statistics reported below are adjusted using thesecorresponding weights.  
5 For example, information on health, consumption, and female empowerment, among others, was obtained from the 
female while information on agricultural production was obtained from the male. 
6 Although the survey instrument is less disaggregated than that used by the National Sample Survey (NSS), it 
follows the overall structure used there.  
7 For fruits or vegetables where the survey includes only aggregate spending, we use the 55
th round of the National 
Sample Survey (NSS) to derive the price and caloric content of a representative basket of these consumed in Andhra 
Pradesh.  
8 Financial assets were excluded due to concerns about misreporting. Asset values were measured as in December 
2003 in the 2004 survey and in June 2006 in the 2006 survey. 
9 The adult equivalent measures for caloric and protein consumption are obtained using nutritional requirements by 
sex and age as weights, i.e., weights are 1.2 for adult males, 0.9 for adult females, 1.0 for adolescents (12 to 21 
years), 0.8 for children aged 9 to 12, 0.7 for children aged 7 to 9, 0.6 for children aged 5 to 7, 0.5 for children aged 3 
to 5, and 0.4 for children younger than 3 (Gopalan et al. 2004). For income and overall consumption, we assign 
weights to be 0.78 for anyone older than 60 or younger than 14. 
  7discrepancies between the treated and the control persisted. This imbalance on household characteristics 
may derive from the fact that randomization is at the mandal level and the small number of mandals in 
treatment and control areas (41 and 10, respectively).  
2.3 SHG level evidence  
In each village, the 2004 survey also canvassed six randomly selected SHGs with a group level 
instrument that included retrospective information going back to 2001. The 2
nd round revisited all SHGs 
included in the original sample, plus up to two newly formed groups per village.
10 Table 3 presents 
participation rates of program SHGs based on household-level data and summarizes SHG activities based 
on SHG-level data in treatment and control areas in 2001, 2003 and 2006, respectively. Note that 2001 is 
the start year of the program, 2003 is when the program had been active for three years in treated but had 
just started in control areas, and 2006 is when both had been exposed to the program for three or six 
years, respectively. The SHG survey includes program and non-program SHGs. However, most non-
program SHGs converted to program SHGs by 2006. Overall participation rates point towards increased 
program coverage over time in both treatment and control areas, with a clear lag in the latter. In 2006, 
about 46% of households in the treated areas and 33% households in the control areas participated in 
program SHGs. Participation by the poorest and poor households is considerably larger than that of more 
affluent ones, in line with the program’s intention to target the poor.   
In both areas, SHG numbers increased by about 60% from 2001 to 2003, pointing to possible spillovers. 
One notes clear improvements in the level of group activity and adherence to rules over time for SHGs in 
both control and treatment areas, with some lag in control mandals. In treatment areas, the share of groups 
that met at least monthly rose from 48% in 2001 to 71% in 2003, where it more or less leveled off. By 
comparison, there is very little change in meeting frequency for the control before 2003 (from 0.46 to 
0.50) but a marked increase, to 79%, thereafter. Virtually all SHGs indicated that members made savings 
in meetings throughout the 2001 to 2006 period. The data also suggest that the program helped increase 
activity in areas such as insurance, nutrition, marketing, and training which are the responsibility of VOs 
and MSs. In 2003, interventions to reduce vulnerability (i.e. food credit, insurance and disability 
programs), to provide RCL, and to help access markets were implemented by 49%, 40%, and 10% of 
treated groups, with increases to 71%, 54%, and 22%, respectively, in 2006. Groups in the control areas 
lagged in such activities in both 2003 and 2006 although about 17% (vs. 22% in treated areas) 
implemented job training programs for SHG members.  
                                                 
10 Attrition was higher at the group than at the household level, with about 10% of program SHGs and 22% of non-program SHGs having 
disbanded between the two surveys. In SHGs that existed in both periods, 6% of households included in 2003 could no longer be found in 2006. 
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access to bank loans and the project-supported CIF. The share of groups in treatment areas that practiced 
internal lending increased from 28% in 2001 to 55% in 2003 and 86% in 2006, compared to 30%, 38%, 
and 90% in the control group. Still with a median size between Rs. 4,500 and Rs. 10,900, loan sizes 
remained modest. In 2001, a very small share (4%) of groups in the treatment area started to access 
program funds (CIF), a share that increased to 25% in 2003 and to 62% in 2006. Although no groups in 
the control area had access to CIF in 2001 or 2003, they caught up thereafter, with 55% having access in 
2006. At four to 10 times the median internal loan size, CIF resources were larger and more likely to be 
used for investment than internal lending which served mainly to smooth consumption.  
In line with the program’s goal of linking SHGs to commercial banks, access to bank loans increased for 
groups in both control and treatment areas during 2003-2006. The rather slow increase between 2001 and 
2003 in treatment areas suggests that access to bank loans is not immediate and points to startup problems 
associated with developing the program implementation structure. At the same time, the median size of 
such loans (which were on-lent internally by the group) increased from R 15,000 to R 50,000, 
highlighting the increased credit-worthiness of the groups, partly due to the CIF funds. Median size and 
length of internal loans (some R 6000 in 2003 and R 10,000 in 2006; 12 months) were lower than those of 
bank loans and CIF resources and about half of internal loans were used for consumption smoothing. 
3. Identification strategy and hypotheses  
To do justice to the program’s broad scope, we use a combination of DD and propensity score matching 
to assess program impacts it will be of interest to assess impacts on nutrition, consumption, and asset 
accumulation. As these are likely to vary not only between treatment and control area but also between 
SHG participants and non-participants and, for the latter possibly by initial wealth status, we use different 
ways of defining treatment and control to be able to make inferences on these.  
3.1 Identification strategy and approach 
Rather than assessing only the average treatment effect on the treated, we are interested in three impact 
estimates, namely (i) mean program impact on all households in program villages, equivalent to intention 
to treat; (ii) average treatment effects (ATE) on direct participants in program SHGs; and (iii) possibly 
heterogeneous impacts on program SHG members based on their initial poverty status.  
To evaluate mean program impact, we use information from households located in the control areas as a 
control for those in treated areas, irrespective of participation status. As the program became available to 
the latter in 2001 and to the former in 2003/4, the “treatment effect” in our sample refers to the difference 
of impact between some 5.5 years and 3 years of program exposure. Our estimate will thus constitute a 
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groups. To address possibly non-random nature of program placement, we combine difference-in-
difference (DD) estimates with propensity score (PS) matching as explained below. 
As households are self-selected into program SHGs, credibly estimating ATE on program SHG 
participants requires adjusting for differences in observable and unobservable characteristics of this 
group. To do so, we use the fact that we know participation status of control households in 2006, after the 
program had been made available to them to define an appropriate control. That is, we use participants in 
the control mandals to form a control for participants in the treatment mandals. This strategy is essentially 
a pipeline comparison. By so doing, combined with DD, we circumvent the self-selection problem by 
assuming unobservables that jointly affect sequential changes of outcomes and self-selection into program 
SHGs are identical for participants in treatment and control areas. PS matching method is then used to 
balance the treated and the control samples in terms of observable attributes. Similar to the estimates for 
mean program impact, our estimates here constitute a lower bound of the true impact of program SHG 
participation as the control mandals started to have access to the program in late 2003. Since 2.5 to 3 
years is considered to be close to the time period required for newly formed groups to fully develop and 
attain a certain level of maturity, this can be interpreted as difference in performance between mature and 
non-mature groups exposed to the program. In order to see whether the program generated some spillover 
effects (through SHG participants), we estimate the ATE on non-participants of program SHGs in the 
treated mandals, using non-participants in the control mandals as a control. Figure 1 illustrates treated and 
control groups in estimating ATE on program SHG participants and non-participants, respectively. 
To check possible interactions of program impact with initial wealth, we use households’ initial poverty 
ranking (poorest of the poor, poor, and non-poor) that was established before program start as a 
classification variable. Program SHG members in the corresponding wealth group in control mandals, 
based on 2006 participation status,, can then serve as a control for those in treatment mandals, allowing us 
to estimate impacts on SHG member households by their initial poverty category.  
To illustrate our approach, which combines difference-in-difference and PS matching, let  1  D  if a 
household is treated and   otherwise.
11 Let corresponding outcomes at time   be denoted by 
. The gain from treatment is   and we are interested in the average effect of treatment 
on the treated (ATT),  . As is known, the inability to observe treated households in 
state 0 prevents us from estimating the ATT directly. As we observe outcomes from 2003/4 and 
2005/2006, we use DD to control for household fixed effects. With t denoting 2005/6 and t-1 2003/04, the 
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11 Note that “treatment” is defined as having been exposed to the program for 5.5 years as compared to 3 years for the control.  
  10standard DD estimator   provides an unbiased estimate of 
ATT conditional on  . However, this condition will not hold 
if household characteristics or initial conditions affect subsequent changes of the outcome variables and 
have different distributions in the treatment and control groups.  
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To account for this, we combined the DD approach with PS matching to balance household characteristics 
and initial conditions.
12 The assumption underlying PS matching is that, conditional on observables, the 
outcome change if not treated is independent of the actual treatment, i.e.,  . This has 
been shown to imply    where   is the propensity score, defined as 
 which, by definition, takes a value between 0 and 1 (Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983). We use a PS-weighted regression method (Hirano et al. 2003) which recovers an estimate of the 
ATT as the parameter 
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where i indexes household, and weights equal one for treated and   for non-treated 
observations. See (Chen et al. 2007, van de Walle and Mu 2007) for empirical applications of this 
method. 
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otherwise. It has been shown that under homoskedasticity this trimming method minimizes the variance 
of the estimated ATT (Crump et al. 2007). Our results are based on trimmed PS-weighted DD throughout. 
                                                 
12 Cluster at the village level was used throughout to control for village-level random effects. 
  11We also report the results for the untrimmed simple DD to highlight that trimming and matching will be 
needed even if mandals were randomly selected.  
3.2 Outcome variables of interest  
Evidence thus far suggests a number of hypotheses regarding program impacts. First, as in-kind credit for 
food was an important tool to induce group formation, we would expect changes in nutritional intake, 
especially in the early phases of program implementation. The cows or buffaloes for milk production 
which many of the groups acquired with credit funds would also improve access to protein. Second, 
participation in groups and the access to internal lending it provides should not only reduce vulnerability 
and improved nutrition but also enhance income. Third, improved credit access, especially use of bank 
and CIF loans, should further encourage investment and asset accumulation. 
As access to CIF resources, bank loans, and in-kind credit for food were targeted towards SHG members, 
we expect benefits to be limited to group members. Given the direct resource transfers involved and the 
fact that these are limited to SHG members, it is less likely that non-SHG members in the treatment area 
also benefited (e.g. from marketing activities or insurance programs) through spillover effects. Moreover, 
to the extent that SHGs offer members a menu of options the realization of which depends at least 
partially on wealth, the nature and magnitude of effects even for SHG participants may be affected by 
initial endowments. For example, in-kind credit and internal lending will be particularly attractive for the 
poor, while marketing provide larger benefits to the non-poor. At the same time, the poor and non-poor 
may also differ in how to use loans, and the poorest may not want to take out large loans due to lack of 
complementary assets or skills or just because of the fear of not being able to repay. 
4. Estimation results 
The methodological framework discussed provides estimates of program effects overall and for different 
groups. Positive and significant effects on SHG members’ expenditure, nutritional intake, and asset 
accumulation appear to be driven mainly by poor participants. Interestingly, the poorest significantly 
increased asset accumulation but not consumption. Lack of significant results for non-poor participants 
may be attributed to limited power arising from the small sample size rather than the absence of impact.  
4.1 Selection equations and mean program impacts 
Table 4 presents logit regression results of program placement overall (col. 1) and for SHG-participants 
and non-participants (cols. 2 and 3). In each case, the dependent variable is 1 if the household (in the sub-
group of interest) is located in a treated mandal and 0 otherwise. Household demographics (location, 
caste, female headship, and literacy) and initial economic conditions (poverty status, land ownership, 
consumption, nutritional intake, and non-financial assets) serve as explanatory variables. While the low 
  12pseudo R
2 is in line with random selection of control mandals, results in col. 1 suggest that the program 
did target the poorest of the poor and scheduled tribes/castes. Land ownership is marginally significant 
and one notes regional differences in the extent of program implementation across regions. Estimated 
propensity scores are then used to balance these variables that may influence outcomes. Appendix table 
A1 displays simple differences between treatment and control for the untrimmed and the PS-weighted and 
trimmed samples overall (cols. 1, 2), for participants (cols. 3, 4), and non-participants (cols. 5, 6). While 
there are a few significant differences in the unadjusted sample, trimming and matching based on the 
estimated PS balance all variables of interest.  
Estimates for average treatment effects on households in the treated mandals based on the trimmed 
on-participants in treated mandals 
food by allowing households to consume products (e.g. milk) from livestock acquired through CIF funds.  
sample are reported in the bottom panel of table 5 with simple DDs based on the total sample included in 
the top panel for comparison. We note a significant impact on investment in non-financial assets which is 
estimated to be higher by R 581 or 16% for treated as compared to counterfactual based on the PS-
weighted DD regression using the trimmed samples. This suggests that once groups did achieve a level of 
maturity, the program’s objective of inducing higher investment and capital formation was achieved. 
However, we fail to find significant impact on consumption or nutritional intake. As the estimated impact 
is an average over SHG members and non-members in program villages, it is possible that program effect 
on members in terms of consumption and nutrition may not be detected at standard significance levels and 
we turn to exploring the impact on SHG members to obtain further insight.  
4.2 Impacts by type of SHG participation and initial poverty status 
Table 6 reports the estimated ATE on program SHG participants and n
separately. Contrary to the lack of such significance for the overall sample, we find significant impacts on 
consumption, nutritional intake, and asset accumulation for SHG members. None of these variables is 
significant for non-members, though, suggesting that spillover effects are limited, if at all present. The 
magnitude of estimated impacts is quite large; for participants, the increment in per capita consumption 
compared to the counterfactual is estimated to amount to R 864/year (about US$ 16.8) per capita or some 
11 percentage points. Estimated increases in per capita intake of energy and protein and investment in 
non-financial assets amount to 10 (210 calories/day), 16 (7 gram/day), and 23 (R 720) percentage points, 
respectively. These are large effects, especially because a number of factors, such as cross-border 
spillovers and learning by the agencies responsible for implementation, will bias estimates downwards 
and in view of the fact that non-negligible gains in nutritional intake may already have occurred during 
the program’s initial three years (Deininger and Liu 2009). The observed pattern could be due to the 
nature of the interventions that aimed to help households diversify their diet and access higher quality 
  13To make inferences on total program benefits, we note that, by the time our survey was undertaken, the 
program had reached a total of 2.29 million households with average household size being 4.4 after 
adjusting for adult equivalence. Multiplying the estimated ATE on participants’ consumption per capita 
(US$ 16.8) with the number of participating individuals, assuming that future benefits will at least be 
maintained at the current level, and applying a 0.9 discount factor, would imply a net present value of 
benefits from the project of about US$ 1,690 million, significantly above the project cost (US$ 110 
million). Even under the conservative assumption that consumption benefits only lasted for one year the 
estimated benefits still significantly exceed project costs, with a benefit-cost ratio of 1.5:1.  
In view of the significant differences in human and physical capital endowments in the project area, it 
would not be too surprising to find that the project affected poor and non-poor participants differently. 
                                                
Evidence of such differential impact could, for example, help to adapt the intervention more closely to the 
need of its intended target groups. To obtain further insight into this, we estimate impacts on participants 
with different initial poverty levels.
13 Estimated impacts for each sub-group and test results for differential 
impacts across sub-groups are reported in table 7. We find positive and significant impacts on per capita 
consumption (R 1218/year, R 511 of food and R 707 of non-food consumption), nutritional intake (321 
Kcals/day in energy and 7.54 g/day in protein intake), and asset accumulation (R 1194) for initially poor 
households. The increase in consumption and nutritional intake is around 15% of the counterfactual, the 
increment in asset endowments is as high as 26%. For the poorest of the poor, estimated impacts on per 
capita nutritional intake (286 Kcals/day in energy intake and 6.85 g/day in protein intake) and asset 
accumulation (R 757) are statistically significant.  However, we find only marginally significant impacts 
on consumption. Although the magnitudes of estimated impact for the poorest households are lower that 
those for the poor households, the percentage change in nutritional intake is about the same and the 
percentage change in asset (about 50%) is much higher than the latter. At the same time, no or only 
marginally significant impacts are detected for the non-poor members.  
 
13 Appendix table A4 lists means of outcome variables for our sub-groups of POP, Poor, Non-Poor members separately. Not surprisingly, 
descriptive statistics suggest richer households had higher consumption and asset than poorer ones in both periods. We can see the same trend for 
nutritional intake though not as obviously as consumption and asset. 
  144.3 Power analysis  
To assess how confident we can be to claim that failure to detect impacts is due to the absence of 
economically meaningful impact rather than just low power of our tests, we compute, for each of the 
cases where we fail to obtain significant impacts, the probabilities of type 2 error (i.e. of wrongly 
accepting the null hypothesis) if the actual impact is 10% or 5% of the counterfactual. The formula used 
is        T T A se CF x T T A ˆ / % ˆ Pr     , where  (.)   is the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution, CF denotes the counterfactual, and se(.)  the standard error. Under the 
assumption that an impact equal to x% of the counterfactual is an appropriate lower bound of economic 
significance, a low probability thus implies that we can be confident of no impact, and a high probability 
indicates a low power of our test. 
Results are reported in table 8 for non-members (col.1-3), the poorest of the poor (col. 4-6), and non-poor 
(col. 7-9). For non-members, the very low probabilities for food consumption and nutritional intake (less 
than 3%) provide strong evidence against spillovers for these variables. For asset accumulation, the 
probability is relatively high, suggesting that we have no evidence to either support or reject the existence 
of spillovers. We can see that the power of the test is very low for consumption for the poorest of the poor 
members and for asset accumulation by non-poor members. Clearly, and in line with evidence of these 
impacts being significant at 10% level for a one-sided test, the lack of statistical significance in this case 
may be due to low power of the test given the small number of observations of the non-poor (only 154). 
By comparison, the power is relatively high for food consumption and energy intake by non-poor 
members, in line with the notion that these groups have either already attained their desired levels of these 
variables or that whatever effect was due to the program already materialized during the first three years 
of program implementation.  
5. Conclusion  
This paper was motivated by the fact that, despite considerable interest in SHG-based approaches to 
micro-finance, rigorous evaluations of the impact of such intervention are still scant and that even studies 
pointing to clear social, empowerment, and nutritional impacts were unable to ascertain economic effects. 
Availability of data between 3 and 6 years after group formation allows us to make inferences on whether 
such an inability is due to the lack of impact or the fact that, in view of the target groups’ deficient human 
and physical capital endowments, economic effects may take longer to materialize. As a corollary, we can 
check whether economic effects are limited to those in the target group who are more entrepreneurial.  
Using propensity-score weighted double differences on an appropriately trimmed sample and noting that 
for various reasons our estimates will constitute a lower bound of true effects, we find that, in the areas 
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considered, SHG participation had significant economic impacts. Assuming that benefits will be 
maintained at current levels, benefits significantly exceed program costs. Interestingly, benefits were not 
confined to those who had been more affluent to start with; in fact there is significant asset accumulation 
among the poorest of the poor who, partly as a result and partly due to the fact that gains in calorie and 
protein intake had already been realized shortly after program start-up, saw their consumption increase by 
less than the poor. This implies that, to the extent that they participate in SHGs, the poorest seem to be 
able to benefit not only socially but also economically. We failed to detect significant impacts on the non-
poor, likely due to low power of our tests given the small number of observations of the non-poor.  
Our results suggests that a program that not only fosters group formation but also supports more mature 
groups through federation and credit access can have significant economic benefits in the long term. To 
assess the overall desirability and impact of such programs, a key question relates to the extent to which 
benefits will be maintained once outside support is terminated. The answer will at least partly depend on 
whether either the SHGs established by the program continue to operate – possibly adjusting the services 
offered to the level of member development – and, related to this, whether beneficiary households will be 
able to use the one-time injection of credit and capacity to push them on a permanently higher trajectory 
of economic activity and asset accumulation. Answering this question is beyond the scope of this paper 
and will require additional information based on group and individual activity after external support had 
been terminated. Still, the fact that we find non-negligible economic impacts in the case of AP implies 
that probing further in this direction to assess determinants and implications of the sustainability of SHGs 
and the benefits they provide to their membership could be of considerable interest for researchers and 
policy-makers alike.  Table 1. Sample means and standard deviations of outcome variables in treated and control households 
  2003/2004   2005/2006  
Variable Control  Treated  Control  Treated 
Consumption p.c. (Rs/year)  7920  (4386)  7226  (3820)  8748  (4247)  8582  (4140) 
    Food (Rs/year)  3886  (1768)  3695  (1612)  4298  (1850)  4146  (1796) 
    Non-food (Rs/year)  4034  (3164)  3531  (2794)  4450  (3196)  4436  (3031) 
Energy  intake  p.c.  (Kcal/day)  2111 (712) 2144 (691) 2343  (979) 2322 (887) 
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  49  (18)  51  (18)  49  (19)  50  (18) 
Total non-financial assets p.c. (Rs)  3133  (3781)  3506  (4248)  3605  (4671)  4438  (6086) 
Number of observations  526  1880  526  1880 
Source: Own computation from 2004 and 2006 SERP/CESS impact evaluation surveys. Sample weights applied. 
  17Table 2. Sample means and variances of household demographics and initial conditions  
Variable All  Control  Treated 
Household lived in hamlet  0.20  (0.40) 0.17 (0.38) 0.21 (0.40) 
Scheduled caste  0.13  (0.34) 0.18 (0.38) 0.12 (0.32) 
Scheduled  tribe  0.16 (0.37) 0.05 (0.22) 0.19 (0.39) 
Backward caste  0.54  (0.50) 0.57 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 
Other caste  0.17  (0.38)  0.20 (0.40) 0.16 (0.37) 
Household size  4.94  (2.07)  4.56 (1.93) 5.05 (2.10) 
Household female headed  0.11  (0.31) 0.12 (0.33) 0.10 (0.30) 
Some member can write  0.84  (0.37) 0.82 (0.39) 0.84 (0.36) 
Poorest  of  poor  0.25 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.26 (0.44) 
Poor    0.27 (0.44) 0.27 (0.45) 0.27 (0.44) 
Not very poor   0.24  (0.43)  0.27  (0.45)  0.24  (0.43) 
Not  poor    0.23 (0.42) 0.22 (0.41) 0.24 (0.43) 
Land ownership   0.72  (0.45) 0.67 (0.47) 0.73 (0.44) 
Located in Telangana  0.30  (0.46) 0.35 (0.48) 0.29 (0.45) 
Located  in  Rayalaseema  0.38 (0.49) 0.29 (0.45) 0.40 (0.49) 
Located in Coastal AP  0.32  (0.46) 0.36 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 
Number of observations  2406  526  1880 
Source: Own computation from 2004 and 2006 SERP/CESS impact evaluation surveys. Sample weights applied. 
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 2001  2003  2006 
  Control Treated    Control Treated    Control Treated   






Overall participation rate  0.0%  10.5% ***  29.5%  42.2% *** 33.4%  45.6% *** 
   % participated of very poor households 0.0%  12.6%  ***  29.4% 49.8%  ***  36.9%  54.1%  *** 
   % participated of poor households  0.0% 11.7%  ***  38.2%  49.0%  ***  41.8%  51.5%  ** 
   % participated of middle or rich class 0.0%  8.7%  ***  24.8%  34.2%  **  27.1%  37.7%  ** 
 






Meet at least monthly  0.44  0.48   0.46  0.71  ***  0.79 0.75  * 
Members make savings in meetings 0.97  0.88  ***  1.00  1.00  *  0.92  0.88  ** 
 






Activities to reduce vulnerability  0.13  0.09    0.24  0.49  ***  0.46  0.71  *** 
If access to food credit program  0.00  0.00    0.05  0.40  ***  0.24  0.54  *** 
Marketing activities undertaken  0.03 0.04   0.05 0.10  ***  0.14  0.22  *** 
Employment program /job training   --  --  --  --  --  --  0.17  0.22  ** 
 






Practice internal lending  0.30  0.28   0.38  0.55  ***  0.90 0.86  
   if yes, median internal loan size   7050  4500  --  6200  5926  --  10000  10900  -- 
   if yes, median internal loan length   --  --  --  12  10  --  12  12  -- 
  share for consumption smoothing  0.49  0.45   0.53  0.48  0.44 0.47  
  share for investment  0.34  0.47  ** 0.40  0.44  0.47 0.45  
Have access to CIF   0.00 0.04  ***  0.00 0.25  ***  0.55  0.62  ** 
   if yes, median size   --  38143  --  --  34000  --  21000  40500  -- 
   if yes, median length (months)  --  --  --  --  20  --  12  20  -- 
   consumption smoothing main purpose  --  0.03  --  --  0.07  --  0.07 0.05  
   investment main purpose  --  1.00  --  --  0.95  --  0.90  0.90   
Access bank loans   0.55  0.41  ***  0.37  0.45  **  0.87 0.88  
   if yes, median size   15000  15000  --  30000  24000  --  51000  50000  -- 
   if yes, median length (months)  --  --  --  12  12  --  20  20  -- 
   consumption smoothing main purpose 0.49 0.37  **  0.35 0.39    0.32  0.07  *** 
   investment main purpose  0.67 0.77  *  0.73 0.81  *  0.64  0.88  *** 
Group’s account balance   0.01  0.01   0.09  0.22  ***      
Number of observations (SHGs)  179  691    294  1092    278  1085   
Source: Own computation from 2004 and 2006 SERP/CESS impact evaluation surveys.  
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 Overall  Participants Non-participants 
Variable Coeff.  (s.e.)  Sig.  Coeff. (s.e.)  Sig.  Coeff.  (s.e.)  Sig. 
Household demographics                 
Household lived in hamlet  -0.020 0.126   0.054  0.214   -0.114  0.161  
Scheduled tribe/caste  0.777  0.179 ***  0.974  0.336 ***  0.465  0.217 ** 
Backward caste  0.235  0.152    0.166  0.301   0.219  0.180  
Household size  0.157  0.034  ***  0.111  0.054 **  0.174  0.044 *** 
Household female headed  -0.214  0.157   -0.184  0.269   -0.245  0.198  
Some member can write  0.030  0.137   -0.155  0.242   0.064  0.171  
Located in Telangana  -0.646  0.147 ***  -0.639  0.225 ***  -0.706  0.199 *** 
Located  in  Rayalaseema  0.338 0.131 ***  1.353  0.295 ***  0.070  0.164  
Household initial conditions                  
Poorest of poor household  0.352  0.153 **  0.412  0.263   0.286  0.195  
Poor household  0.105  0.139    0.072  0.240   0.110  0.177  
Land ownership  0.217  0.117  *  0.361  0.199 *  0.022  0.149  
Consumption p.c. (10,000Rs/year)  -0.164 0.123   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  
Energy intake p.c. (1,000Kcal/day)  -0.594 0.236 **  0.000  0.000 ***  0.000  0.000  
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  0.044 0.010 ***  0.074  0.017 ***  0.025  0.013 * 
Total non-financial asset p.c. (10,000Rs)  0.159  0.123    0.324  0.263   0.082  0.136  
Constant -0.864  0.331  ***  -0.525  0.572   -0.773  0.422 * 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.050     0.103     0.035    
Number  of  observations  2406     1111     1295    
Significance of coefficient is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Estimated average treatment effects 
  Untrimmed sample, simple DD 
 Treated  Control  DD.  (se)  Sig. 
Consumption p.c. (Rs/year)  1356  828  528  (292)  * 
    Food (Rs/year)  451  413  38  (139)   
    Non-food (Rs/year)  905  416  490  (222)  ** 
Energy intake p.c. (Kcal/day)  177  232  -55  (68)   
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  -0.78  0.28  -1.06  (1.51)   
Non-financial asset p.c. (Rs)  932  472  460  (234)  ** 
No. of obs.  1880 526       
  Trimmed sample, PS weighted DD 
 Treated  Control  DD.  (se)  Sig. 
Consumption p.c. (Rs/year)  1414  1059  355  (295)   
    Food (Rs/year)  518  451  67  (153)   
    Non-food (Rs/year)  896  608  288  (228)   
Energy intake p.c. (Kcal/day)  236  210  26  (78)   
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  1.17  -0.74  1.91  (1.79)   
Non-financial asset p.c. (Rs)  926  345  581  (273)  ** 
No. of obs.  1683 516       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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  Untrimmed sample, simple DD 
 Participants  Non-participants 
Consumption p.c. (Rs/year)  1103  (400)  ***  195  (423)   
    Food (Rs/year)  257  (175)  (*)  -89  (190)   
    Non-food (Rs/year)  846  (296)  ***  283  (343)   
Energy intake p.c. (Kcal/day)  94  (86)    -132  (91)   
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  1.96  (1.86)    -2.58  (2.03)   
Non-financial asset p.c. (Rs)  711  (289)  ***  340  (345)   
No. of obs.  920+191=1111  962+333=1295 
  Trimmed sample, PS weighted DD 
 Participants  Non-participants 
Consumption p.c. (Rs/year)  864  (384)  *  -19  (446)   
    Food (Rs/year)  345  (219)  (*)  -181  (210)   
    Non-food (Rs/year)  519  (252)  *  163  (365)   
Energy intake p.c. (Kcal/day)  210  (110)  *  -84  (102)   
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  6.99  (2.31)  ***  -1.61  (2.40)   
Non-financial asset p.c. (Rs)  720  (311)  **  231  (399)   
No. of obs.  664+176=840  908+332=1240 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for two-sided test;  
(*) significant at 10% for one-sided test 
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  Untrimmed sample, simple DD 
  POP   Poor   Non-poor  
Consumption  p.c.  (Rs/year)  615 (425)    819 (438)  *  1728 (702)  ** 
    Food (Rs/year)  53  (224)    120  (231)    511  (387)  (*) 
    Non-food (Rs/year)  562  (314)  *  699  (341)  **  1217  (433)  *** 
Energy  intake  p.c.  (Kcal/day)  176 (116)    77 (107)    18 (204)   
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  2.14  (2.92)   0.91  (2.49)   1.73  (3.66)  
Non-financial asset p.c. (Rs)  558  (215)  ***  428  (377)    1219  (585)  ** 
No. of obs.  407+73=480  308+71=379  205+47=252 
  Trimmed sample, PS weighted DD 
  POP   Poor   Non-poor  
Consumption  p.c.  (Rs/year)  677 (455)  (*)  1218 (524)  **  -143 (1317)  
    Food (Rs/year)  295  (281)    511  (252)  **  -289  (679)   
    Non-food (Rs/year)  382  (293)  (*)  707  (425)  *  146  (728)   
Energy  intake  p.c.  (Kcal/day)  286 (144)  ***  321 (111)  ***  -101 (326)   
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  6.85  (3.87) *  7.54  (2.32) ***  4.21  (5.33)  
Non-financial asset p.c. (Rs)  757  (257)  ***  1194  (440)  ***  1066  (703)  (*) 
No. of obs.  331+73=404   (.94)  178+65=243  (.90)  113+44=157 (.89) 
 Significance of coefficient is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for two-sided test; (*) 
significant at 10% for one-sided test 
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Variables  Non-members  Poorest of the Poor  members  Non-poor members 
  Est. level  Probability is   Est. level  Probability is   Est. level  Probability is  
    10% 5%  (level)  10% 5%  (level)  10% 5% 
Consumption p.c.   -19  1.0%  11.7%  677  51.2% 77.6%  -143  18.0% 30.4% 
    Food (Rs/year)  -181  0.1%  1.7%  295  42.6%  66.7%  -289  11.8%  21.0% 
    Non-food (Rs/year)  163  19.7%  42.9%  382  58.9%  77.8%  146  29.0%  43.0% 
Energy intake p.c.   -84  0.0%  1.2%        -101  13.4%  23.9% 
Protein intake p.c.  -1.61  0.1% 2.9%        4.21 44.8%  62.9% 
Non-fin. asset p.c.  231  31.3% 53.6%        1066  82.6% 89.0% 
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Table A.1. Balance check for all households, participates, and non-participants 
 Overall  Participants Non-participants 
Variable  Simple     PS wgt.    Simple    PS wgt.   
Simpl
e   PS  wgt.   
Household demographics                    
Household lived in hamlet  0.033    0.018   0.068 *  0.029   0.006   0.016  
Scheduled tribe/caste  0.074  **  -0.001   0.152 ***  0.020   0.002   -0.004  
Backward caste  -0.037    0.021   -0.149 **  -0.047   0.036   0.021  
Household size  0.490  ***  0.063   0.324   0.002   0.515 ***  -0.085  
Household female headed  -0.021    0.008   -0.019   0.016   -0.021   0.015  
Some member can write  0.024    0.009   0.005   -0.003   0.032   0.007  
Located in Telangana  -0.060    -0.033   -0.042   -0.022   -0.099   -0.049  
Located in Rayalaseema  0.111    0.052   0.199 ***  0.059   0.101   0.077  
Household initial conditions                       
Poorest of poor household  0.017    0.000   0.039   -0.004   -0.011   -0.001  
Poor household  -0.002    -0.009   -0.036   0.003   0.002   -0.003  
Land ownership  0.070  ***  0.008   0.099 **  -0.023   0.048   0.006  
Consumption p.c. (10,000Rs/year)  -0.040    -0.037   -0.038   -0.006   -0.022   -0.017  
Energy intake p.c. 
(10,000Kcal/day) 0.004    -0.005   0.004   -0.003   0.006   -0.000  
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  2.273    -1.236   3.525 **  -0.662   1.666   0.112  
Total non-financial asset 
(10,000Rs)  0.005    -0.041   0.067   -0.069   -0.019   -0.040  
Number  of  observations  2406   2232   1111   850   1295   1246  
Significance of coefficient is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for two-sided test 
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  Very poor  Poor  Not so poor/non-poor 
Variable Simple      PS  wgt.    Simple    PS  wgt.  Simple  PS  wgt.  
Household demographics                    
Household lived in hamlet  0.029    0.022  0.060    0.019   0.090  *  0.016   
Scheduled tribe/caste  0.269  ***  0.054  0.179 **  0.083   0.036   0.049   
Backward caste  -0.240  ***  -0.030  -0.090    -0.093   -0.165  **  -0.116   
Household size  0.302    -0.064  0.443  **  -0.189  0.047    0.003   
Household female headed  -0.082    -0.009  -0.005    -0.008  0.008    0.018   
Some member can write  0.039    0.025  -0.044    -0.047  0.048    0.039   
Located in Telangana  0.155  *  0.035  -0.064    -0.003   -0.141   0.037   
Located in Rayalaseema  0.069    -0.019  0.194 ***  0.017 *  0.287  ***  -0.018   
Household initial conditions                       
Land ownership  0.220  ***  0.036  0.076    0.034   0.054   -0.032   
Consumption p.c. (10,000Rs/year)  -0.012    -0.024  -0.018    0.004   -0.062    0.075   
Energy intake p.c. (10,000Kcal/day)  0.003    -0.010  0.014  *  0.003   -0.001    0.002   
Protein intake p.c. (g/day)  3.498    -2.610  5.823 ***  0.981   2.120   0.047   
Total non-financial asset (10,000Rs)  0.075  ***  -0.008  0.037    -0.013  0.147 *  0.024   
Number of observations  480    411  379    239   257   146   
Significance of coefficient is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for two-sided test 
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Table A.3. Means of outcome variables for program SHG participants and non-participants at the two survey dates  
Variable Participants  Non-participants 
 Control  Treated  Control  Treated 
  03/04  05/06  03/04  05/06 03/04 05/06 03/04 05/06 
Consumption  p.c.  (Rs/year)  7606  7935  6928  8363 8086 9179 7479 8771 
    Food (Rs/year)  3777  4005  3632  4116  3943  4454  3747  4170 
    Non-food (Rs/year)  3829  3931  3295  4247  4143  4725  3732  4601 
Energy  intake  p.c.  (Kcal/day)  2092  2195  2119  2310 2121 2419 2165 2326 
Protein  intake  p.c.  (g/day)  48  45  51  50 49 51 50 49 
Non-financial  asset  p.c.  (Rs) 2864  3016  3651  4534 3270 3904 3349 4337 




Table A.4. Means of outcome variables for program SHG participants at different poverty levels at the two survey dates  
Variable Very  poor  Poor  Non-poor 
  Control Treated Control Treated  Control  Treated 
  03/04  05/06 03/04 05/06 03/04 05/06 03/04 05/06 03/04 05/06 03/04 05/06 
Consumption  p.c.  (Rs/year)  6422  6972 6179 7345 6810 7388 6550 7946 9066 9035 7840 9538 
    Food (Rs/year)  3358  3748  3337  3780  3455  3826  3469  3960  4331  4327  3993  4501 
    Non-food (Rs/year)  3064  3225  2842  3564  3356  3562  3081  3986  4735  4708  3847  5037 
Energy  intake  p.c.  (Kcal/day) 2051  1996 2053 2174 1959 2063 2092 2273 2232 2436 2190 2412 
Protein  intake  p.c.  (g/day)  47  43 50 48 45 43 51 50 50 48 52 52 
Non-financial asset p.c. (Rs)  1203  1385  1893  2632  2525  2933  2792  3628  4289  4198  5562  6690 
Number of observations  73  407  71  308  47  205 
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